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IV. Condemnation
A. Discovery of Expert Opinions-United States v.
Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968).
The case of United States v. Meyer1 made an important contri-
bution toward ensuring that the requirement of "just compensation"
in eminent domain proceedings would not be merely an empty
phrase. In a decision which will have a great impact in many fields
besides condemnation, the Ninth Circuit, represented in this case by
Judges Hamlin, Jertberg and Browning, held that the proper scope of
civil discovery proceedings in condemnation actions included the
opinions and conclusions of experts hired by the opposing side. This
was not the first instance in which a federal court had reached this
position, but it was the first instance in which a circuit court had
squarely faced and settled this important issue.2  The district courts,
receiving no guidance from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, had
not been able to achieve uniformity.3 Their decisions had ranged
from allowing an adversary to conceal even the names of his experts
to the liberal position adopted in this case.4
The Meyer case arose from a landowner's attempt to gain dis-
closure of the opinions and conclusions of appraisers hired by the
Government with respect to such issues as total value and most profit-
able use. The Government failed to obtain a court order protecting
its experts from such questioning, but even so it ordered its experts
not to answer. An appeal from the refusal to issue the desired pro-
tective order and from the dismissal of the action resulting from the
Government's refusal to answer was brought to the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the refusal to issue the desired protective
order but reversed the district court's dismissal of the condemnation
proceeding on the ground that the complete dismissal was an inappro-
1 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968).
2 Sach v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948), did
allow'a liberal disclosure procedure but seemed to stop at requiring the dis-
closure of factual information.
8 For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Comment, Discovery of Ex-
pert Opinions and Conclusions in Condemnation Proceedings in Federal and
California Courts, 20 HAsT. L.J. 650 (1969); J. MooRE, J. LucAs & B. G A-
rmxn, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTicE, 26.24, at 1523-36, 33.17, at 2343-64 (2d
ed. 1968).
4 See generally Comment, Discovery of Expert Opinions and Conclu-
sions in Condemnation Proceedings in Federal and California Courts, 20
HAsT. L.J. 650 (1969).
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priate penalty since the right of the Government to take the land
had never been challenged.5
The court's overall view of the purpose of discovery proceedings
seemed to play a large role in the decision. Although the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure contained no direct provision on this issue,
they did provide that the rules "shall be construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."6 Judge
Browning wrote: "Because land appraisal is complex and technical,
usually evidence on the issue of value consists principally of the
opinions of opposing experts."7  Since value is very often the only
issue in a condemnation proceeding, to deny disclosure of the opinions
which provide the criteria for reaching a judgment is to frustrate the
entire purpose of discovery. That purpose is to "make a trial less a
game of a blindman's buff and more a fair contest with the basic
issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent."8
With such a frame of reference, it was not at all surprising that
the court failed to be moved by arguments against disclosure that
had been successful in the past. The argument that Meyer had not
shown "good cause" why the requested information should be dis-
closed was summarily rejected. Without a clear idea of the line of
attack that the opposition will use, it is practically impossible for an
attorney to present an efficient cross-examination or an effective
rebuttal.9 The court also rejected the fairly well established fact-
opinion distinction which exempted all opinions from disclosure.
Since no support for this distinction could be found in the Federal
Rules, the court felt the circumstances involved in condemnation
cases demanded that it be dropped.10
Another Government theory was that since the appraisals were
carried out in order to help their attorneys reach a settlement, the
surveys were entitled to immunity from disclosure under the "work-
product of an attorney" doctrine set down in Hickman v. Taylor."
The court felt that this case was distinguishable from Hickman in that
here there was no invasion of the attorney's mind or files and that,
unlike the situation in the Hickman case, the desired information was
not available from another source.' 2 The court agreed that "an
individual who is aware of material facts cannot, simply by repeating
5 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968).
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
7 United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 69 (9th Cir. 1968).
8 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)
(Douglas, J.).
9 United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 75 (9th Cir. 1968).
10 Id. at 72-73.
11 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
12 United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 74 (9th Cir. 1968).
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those facts to his attorney, prevent his adversary from questioning
him as to those facts either before or at the trial."'1  However, the
court did say that any portion of the report that did involve an
attorney's ideas would be given immunity from disclosure by a pro-
tective order.14
The Government's argument that any experts who were not ex-
pected to appear as witnesses at the trial should not be open to any
questioning was by far its most viable one. The Government was
able to point to the proposed amendments to the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and show that although the committee considering these pro-
posals had been in favor of liberalizing discovery procedures in re-
gard to experts expected to appear as witnesses, they had proposed
conditioning the right to question those experts not expected to testify
on a showing that disclosure was necessary to prevent undue hardship
or manifest injustice.'5 The court, nevertheless, rejected this argu-
ment as well: "It would be intolerable to allow a party to suppress
unfavorable evidence by deciding not to use a retained expert at
trial."18
The court's decision is supported by a study of the condemnation
practices of a New York county 1'7 which revealed that the ability to
hide findings by not having an expert testify could play an important
role in many cases. In 48 percent of the cases in which the county
had two separate appraisals made of the value of the land it was
taking, one appraisal was at least 10 percent higher than the other.
In 12 percent of the cases, the difference between the estimates ex-
ceeded 49 percent!' 8 It is obvious that an economy-minded condem-
nor would want to keep the higher estimate secret, but it does not
seem to be consistent with the goal of arriving at just compensation
to allow it to do so. To prevent the burying of relevant evidence in
this manner, complete disclosure of the opinions of those who will not
testify is a necessity.
The court fully realized that this aspect and many other aspects
of discovery proceedings were subject to abuse, but it felt the dis-
13 Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Informa-
tion, 14 STA. L. REV. 455, 463 (1962).
14 See United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 74-75 (9th Cir. 1968).
15 Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Preliminary Draft
of Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts relating to Deposition and Discovery, 43 F.R.D. 211,
225 (1967) (proposed rules 26(b) (4) (A) & (B).
10 United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 76 (9th Cir. 1968).
17 Berger & Rohan, The Nassau County Study: An empirical Look into
the Practices of Condemnation, 67 CoLum. L. REv. 430 (1967). The study was
made in a county consisting mainly of New York City suburbs. The professors
had full access to all the County's condemnation files.
18 Id. at 440.
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cretionary powers afforded the judiciary by the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure19 were sufficient safeguards against injustice. Subject to such
safeguards, the fullest possible disclosure of facts and opinions was
desirable.20
Another consideration that probably influenced the court to allow
full discovery was the growing awareness that under present condem-
nation practices the condennor has an unfair advantage over the
average landowner. Studies have shown that the condemnor is not
always above using its power to force down prices. Often a landowner
is forced to accept a price he feels to be too low rather than engage
in expensive litigation.21  The Nassau County Study revealed that
"the condermnee who agreed to settle was shockingly underpaid. Only
about one in six (15.75%) realized or bettered the County's low
appraisal, a sum that an impartial observer might consider a sine qua
non for 'just' compensation.122 The Government paid less than 50
percent of the lowest appraisal by a Government appraiser in about
one case of every twelve!23 The power of a condemnor to use such
unfair tactics would be severely limited if a full disclosure of the
findings of their expert appraisers could be obtained.
It is true that a trend toward the holding of the Meyer case was
already fairly well established,24 but with its strong arguments and
unequivocal stand, Meyer should do a great deal toward bringing
other courts to its position. Where both parties are fully aware of all
19 FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (b).
20 United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 75 (9th Cir. 1968).
21 Hearings on S. 1351 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968)
(testimony of Senator Morse). For another approach toward eliminating the
condemnor's advantage in condemnation actions, see Note, Attorneys' Fees
in Condemnation Proceedings, 20 HAsT. L.J. 694 (1969), which supports the
position that the Government should pay the landowner's legal costs if the
court rules that the final Government offer was too low.
22 Berger & Rohan, The Nassau County Study: An Empirical Look into
the Practices of Condemnation, 67 CoLOm. L. REV. 430, 442 (1967).
23 Id. at 443.
24 The greatest progress in liberalizing discovery procedure in regard to
expert witnesses has been in fields where the issues are so complicated that
the testimony of experts is vital. E.g., Empire Scientific Corp. v. Pickering
& Co., 44 F.R.D. 5, 6 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (patents); Besly-Welles Corp. v. Balax,
Inc., 43 F.R.D. 368, 373 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (patents); Diversified Prods Corp. v.
Sports Center Co, 42 F.R.D. 3, 4-5 (D. Md. 1967) (patents); Federal Cartridge
Corp. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 41 F.R.D. 531, 535 (D. Minn. 1967) (in-
ventor uniquely qualified to give opinion on what constitutes theft of his
inventiveness); Luey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 632, 636 (W.D. Mich.
1965) (drugs); Meese v. Eaton Mfg. Co., 35 F.R.D. 162, 165-66 (N.D. Ohio
1964) (patents); United States v. Renault, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(anti-trust); United States v. Nysco Laboratories, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 159, 162
(E.D.N.Y. 1960) (drugs).
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the circumstances, the probability of arriving at truly just compen-
sation is greatly enhanced.
D.A.K.
